Backfire vs an egress allowlist gateway

Backfire compared with an egress allowlist gateway

The gateway category — AI gateways, MCP gateways, egress control appliances — assumes you own the network the traffic leaves from. Put the gateway inline, give it a policy, and nothing in your estate reaches the internet without passing it. That is a stronger control than an application-level relay, and it costs what a platform control costs: infrastructure, a policy owner and a procurement cycle.

Which one you actually need

If your traffic leaves from a Kubernetes estate you operate and a reviewer will ask for network-level enforcement, buy the gateway. If your traffic leaves from serverless functions, an agent runtime or a partner's workflow where you do not control the network at all, a gateway has nowhere to sit — and the enforcement point you can actually own is inside the call.

Enforcement layer

An egress allowlist gateway
Network — inline, in front of the estate
Backfire
Application — the calls you route to it

Policy unit

An egress allowlist gateway
Organisation-wide allowlist and egress rules
Backfire
Per relay key and per account

Coverage

An egress allowlist gateway
Everything the platform runs, including traffic you forgot about
Backfire
Exactly the calls you send it, and nothing else

Setup

An egress allowlist gateway
Infrastructure, policy authoring, rollout
Backfire
One bearer key and a JSON POST

Per-call record

An egress allowlist gateway
Gateway logs and policy decisions
Backfire
Method, target, status, bytes, duration — in your own dashboard

Enterprise requirements

An egress allowlist gateway
SSO, RBAC, certification, support contracts
Backfire
No SSO, no certification, no contract — a single operator

Who owns it

An egress allowlist gateway
A platform or security team
Backfire
Whoever holds the key

Contract shape

An egress allowlist gateway
Annual enterprise agreement
Backfire
Prepaid packs of trips

Side by side

allowlist-gateway
# Gateway model: policy at the edge of your own network
egress-policy: allow *.partner.example, deny 169.254.0.0/16, deny 10.0.0.0/8
# ...enforced for every pod, whether or not the developer knew the rule existed.

# Relay model: the check travels with the call
POST /functions/forward
{ "url": "https://api.partner.example/v1/orders", "method": "GET" }
# → guarded here, because there is no pod to put a policy in front of

Where the other one wins

  • Say it plainly: Backfire does not clear an enterprise security review. There is no SOC 2 report, no ISO certificate, no SLA, no SSO and no per-key host allowlist yet. If those rows are pass/fail for you, the gateway wins on the paperwork alone.
  • A gateway is the better control where it can be installed, because it does not depend on a developer remembering to route the call. Backfire depends on exactly that, and no marketing page changes it.
  • The gap it fills is real though: in Lambda, an edge function, a no-code workflow or an agent tool call, there is no network you can police. The only place left to check a destination is the call itself.
  • Backfire is also one person. That is a trade — faster to talk to, impossible to hold to a support contract. Compare accordingly.

What Backfire will not do

  • No SSO, RBAC, certification, SLA or support contract. An enterprise buyer should pick the gateway.
  • Application-level only: a service that fetches directly is completely uncovered.
  • No per-key host allowlist yet, so policy is the account and the key, not a destination list.
  • Single operator. No audit report, no pen-test attestation, no vendor questionnaire completed.

Other comparisons

Questions about this

Related reading

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