Backfire vs an egress allowlist gateway
Backfire compared with an egress allowlist gateway
The gateway category — AI gateways, MCP gateways, egress control appliances — assumes you own the network the traffic leaves from. Put the gateway inline, give it a policy, and nothing in your estate reaches the internet without passing it. That is a stronger control than an application-level relay, and it costs what a platform control costs: infrastructure, a policy owner and a procurement cycle.
Which one you actually need
If your traffic leaves from a Kubernetes estate you operate and a reviewer will ask for network-level enforcement, buy the gateway. If your traffic leaves from serverless functions, an agent runtime or a partner's workflow where you do not control the network at all, a gateway has nowhere to sit — and the enforcement point you can actually own is inside the call.
Enforcement layer
- An egress allowlist gateway
- Network — inline, in front of the estate
- Backfire
- Application — the calls you route to it
Policy unit
- An egress allowlist gateway
- Organisation-wide allowlist and egress rules
- Backfire
- Per relay key and per account
Coverage
- An egress allowlist gateway
- Everything the platform runs, including traffic you forgot about
- Backfire
- Exactly the calls you send it, and nothing else
Setup
- An egress allowlist gateway
- Infrastructure, policy authoring, rollout
- Backfire
- One bearer key and a JSON POST
Per-call record
- An egress allowlist gateway
- Gateway logs and policy decisions
- Backfire
- Method, target, status, bytes, duration — in your own dashboard
Enterprise requirements
- An egress allowlist gateway
- SSO, RBAC, certification, support contracts
- Backfire
- No SSO, no certification, no contract — a single operator
Who owns it
- An egress allowlist gateway
- A platform or security team
- Backfire
- Whoever holds the key
Contract shape
- An egress allowlist gateway
- Annual enterprise agreement
- Backfire
- Prepaid packs of trips
Side by side
# Gateway model: policy at the edge of your own network
egress-policy: allow *.partner.example, deny 169.254.0.0/16, deny 10.0.0.0/8
# ...enforced for every pod, whether or not the developer knew the rule existed.
# Relay model: the check travels with the call
POST /functions/forward
{ "url": "https://api.partner.example/v1/orders", "method": "GET" }
# → guarded here, because there is no pod to put a policy in front ofWhere the other one wins
- Say it plainly: Backfire does not clear an enterprise security review. There is no SOC 2 report, no ISO certificate, no SLA, no SSO and no per-key host allowlist yet. If those rows are pass/fail for you, the gateway wins on the paperwork alone.
- A gateway is the better control where it can be installed, because it does not depend on a developer remembering to route the call. Backfire depends on exactly that, and no marketing page changes it.
- The gap it fills is real though: in Lambda, an edge function, a no-code workflow or an agent tool call, there is no network you can police. The only place left to check a destination is the call itself.
- Backfire is also one person. That is a trade — faster to talk to, impossible to hold to a support contract. Compare accordingly.
What Backfire will not do
- No SSO, RBAC, certification, SLA or support contract. An enterprise buyer should pick the gateway.
- Application-level only: a service that fetches directly is completely uncovered.
- No per-key host allowlist yet, so policy is the account and the key, not a destination list.
- Single operator. No audit report, no pen-test attestation, no vendor questionnaire completed.
Other comparisons
Questions about this
Related reading
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